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This case is about the Coeur d’Alene Tribe’s rights to water—rights “essential to the life 
of the Indian people,” Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 599 (1963) (“Arizona I”), which “Tribal 
members traditionally [relied on] for food, fiber, transportation, recreation and cultural activities.” 
Idaho v. U.S., 533 U.S. 262, 265 (2001) (“Idaho II”).  The importance of water to the Tribe—for 
both traditional and evolving modern purposes—was a foundational issue in the negotiations 
leading to the establishment of the Tribe’s Reservation in 1873.  The historical record demonstrates 
that the Reservation is located where it is precisely because the United States could achieve its 
objectives—obtaining certain lands from the Tribe and securing a lasting peace—only by agreeing 
to set aside this Reservation, which includes important waterways and water resources, as insisted 
upon by the Tribe.  Idaho II, 533 U.S. at 275-276. 
In its appeal here, the State seeks to undermine the Tribe’s federally protected rights to 
water by evading or obscuring the governing legal principles.  For example, as an adjudication of 
Tribal reserved water rights, this case is governed by federal law.  This is so as a matter of 
constitutional law, as “[w]ith the adoption of the Constitution, Indian relations became the 
exclusive province of federal law.” Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234 
(1985).  As a feature of Tribal property rights, the Tribe’s water rights are unquestionably governed 
by federal law.  Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 597-98; City of Pocatello v. Idaho, 145 Idaho 497, 503, 180 
P.3d 1048, 1054 (2008) (“Pocatello”).  So, although the State begins its argument here by referring 
to the Tenth Amendment and general congressional deference to state water law, State Br. at 16-
17 (quoting California v. U.S., 438 U.S. 645, 653 (1978)), because federal law is controlling, state 






Likewise, it is well established that agreements with Indian tribes—including those that 
define the purposes of an Indian reservation—must be construed as the Indians themselves would 
have understood them.  Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 196 
(1999).  This principle has equal application to treaties, Executive Orders, and other agreements 
with tribes. Winters v. U.S., 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908) (“Winters”); Pocatello, 145 Idaho at 506.  
But in disregard of this principle, the State argues that through ratification of the 1887 and 1889 
Agreements in 1891, the Tribe silently ceded all of its water rights for traditional purposes 
including hunting and fishing.  Nothing in the text of the 1887 or 1889 Agreements or 1891 Act 
says that the Tribe no longer held water rights for hunting and fishing, and the snippets from the 
historical record cited by the State merely refer to farming—they say nothing about divesting the 
Tribe of water rights related to hunting and fishing.  Under the State’s formulation, the United 
States and Tribe agreed to a Reservation for the Tribe with water for broad purposes in 1873, and 
then silently whittled that down to a single purpose and took away water necessary for the Tribe’s 
traditional and other pursuits.  But there is simply no evidence to that effect—and no basis for 
asserting that the Indians would have understood the 1887 and 1889 Agreements to achieve such 
a devastating result.  See Idaho II, 533 U.S. at 278 (finding no evidence that Congress “meant to 
pull a fast one” on the Tribe).  Indeed, the record shows exactly the opposite—that traditional 
practices remained vitally important to the Tribe throughout this period and water for those 
purposes remained central to Tribal life.  
A third, related principle holds that tribal reserved water rights are durable—that once 
established they remain intact and cannot be lost or abrogated, absent clear action by Congress.  
U.S. v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986) (absent express language there must be “clear evidence 
that Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and 





Pocatello, 145 Idaho at 506 (“Congress will not abrogate Indian rights without clear intent and an 
express agreement from the Indians.”). So, once the Tribe’s water rights associated with the 
purposes of the Reservation vested in 1873, those rights continued intact and could only be lost if 
there was clear evidence Congress intended to abrogate them.  Nothing in the 1891 Act, or any 
other statute, furnishes clear evidence that Congress intended to divest the Tribe of any part of its 
water rights.   
This same principle defeats the State’s argument regarding the transfer of certain 
Reservation lands to non-Indian settlers by a 1906 statute allotting Reservation lands to individual 
Indians and opening so-called surplus Reservation lands for sale to non-Indians.  The State 
contends that fee land ownership on the Reservation by non-Indians divests Tribal claims to non-
consumptive instream flows for fishing purposes.  Here again, the State can point to no action by 
Congress clearly intending such a result.  In the absence of such a congressional action divesting 
the pre-existing Tribal right to water, water associated with the Tribal right to fish within the 
Reservation was not lost by the sale of land to settlers.  Indeed, the law is clear that tribal rights—
such as the right to fish—survive not only the transfer of certain lands to settlers in an allotment 
act, but the total termination of a reservation.  Menominee Tribe of Indians v. U.S., 391 U.S. 404, 
410-13 (1968).   
With these basic principles in mind, we turn next to the specific arguments in the State’s 
appeal.    
ARGUMENT 
I. The Purposes of an Indian Reservation Are Broad and Are Not Limited to a 
Single Purpose.  
As this Court has emphasized in discussing tribal reserved water rights: “American law 





Pocatello, 145 Idaho at 506.  Ignoring this fundamental principle, the State assumes that aspects 
of the ruling in U.S. v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978), apply to limit Tribal water rights in this 
case.  State Br. at 17-18.  This flawed assumption is the basis for much of the State’s argument.  
In particular, the State relies on New Mexico in seeking to limit the Tribe’s reserved water rights 
under federal law only to what the State deems to be the “primary” purposes for which the 
Reservation was established.  State Br. at 17.  For any other, “secondary” purposes of the 
Reservation, the State argues that the Tribe has no reserved rights under federal law and must 
obtain water rights in compliance with state law.   
But the approach used in New Mexico to determine the water rights of a national forest has 
no application to the Coeur d’Alene Reservation.  As this Court has recognized, the purposes of 
an Indian reservation must be construed according to well-established principles that apply only 
to Indian tribes:   
First and foremost is the notion that agreements with Indians are to be interpreted to the 
benefit of the tribes.  For example, the Supreme Court has stated,  
[W]e will construe a treaty with the Indians as “that unlettered people” understood 
it, and “as justice and reason demand, in all cases where power is exerted by the 
strong over those to whom they owe care and protection,” and counterpoise the 
inequality “by the superior justice which looks only to the substance of the right, 
without regard to technical rules.” 
U.S. v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81, . . . (1905) (citing Choctaw Nation v. U.S., 119 U.S. 
1, 28, . . . (1886); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, . . . (1899)).  Congress certainly has the 
power to abrogate Indian treaty rights, but its intent to do so must be clear.  See, e.g., 
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, . . . (1999); U.S. v. Dion, 
476 U.S. 734, 739-40, . . . (1986). 
Pocatello, 145 Idaho at 506-07.  It is these principles—not New Mexico’s approach regarding 
national forests—that control in this case.   
Contrary to the State’s contention, an Indian reservation is not limited to having a single 





Reservation is created to provide for the ongoing life of a people on lands promised to them.  As 
would be the case for the life for any people over time, this cannot be reduced to one formulaic 
purpose.  Rather, as the Indians would have understood it at the time the Reservation was 
established, Tribal life on the Coeur d’Alene Reservation involved traditional activities like 
hunting, fishing, and gathering, more modern economic pursuits like farming, and industrial and 
commercial development, and everyday activities like drinking and washing—and water is needed 
for all of these purposes.1  As Winters and its progeny hold, water for an Indian reservation is 
reserved broadly, consistent with the purposes of the reservation, which include providing a 
permanent home for Indians to live—to raise their families, to pursue their traditions, and to 
advance their economies.  See, e.g., Winters, 207 U.S. at 576; Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 598-601. 
Along these lines, for the Coeur d’Alene Reservation the 1873 Agreement provided that 
the “Indians agree to locate and make their homes upon the reservation,” R. at 4202 (Second Aff. 
of Vanessa Boyd Willard (Ex. 5, Agreement with the Coeur d’Alene of July 28, 1873 (“1873 
Agreement”))), and the 1887 Agreement confirmed that the “Reservation shall be held forever as 
Indian lands and as homes for the Coeur d’Alene Indians.”  R. at 1391 (Aff. of Richard J. Hart, 
Ex. 4 (Agreement with the Coeur d’Alene of Mar. 26, 1887 (“1887 Agreement”))).  Broad 
homeland purposes are clearly reflected in the negotiations leading to the creation of the 
Reservation in 1873—in which the Indians emphasized the importance of waters to the present 
and future lives of their people.  See Section II.A infra.  Certainly, the Indians would have 
understood that in agreeing to provide the United States with the lands it coveted and with the 
                                                 
1 The Tribe has appealed the district court’s dismissal of Tribal claims for traditional activities 
other than hunting and fishing, as well as for industrial, commercial, and mixed municipal uses, 
but those are the subject of a separate appeal pending before this Court.  See Coeur d’Alene Tribe 





peace it desired, they were retaining for their Reservation the waters necessary for a viable, long-
term home, not one limited to a single activity.   
In key respects, the purposes of Indian reservations, like the Coeur d’Alene Reservation, 
are the polar opposite from the purposes of national forests, like that at issue in New Mexico.  The 
strong preemptive force of federal law protecting Indian present and future uses of water when 
Indian reservations are established is entirely absent in the case of national forests.  As New Mexico 
states, “Congress authorized the national forest system principally as a means of enhancing the 
quantity of water that would be available to the settlers of the arid west.”  438 U.S. at 713.  In 
sharp contrast, Indian reservations were created to provide places for tribes to maintain and 
develop their homelands, with water for both present and future uses.  Put simply, national forests 
were intended in considerable part to protect settlers in their uses of water under state law while 
Indian reservations were largely intended to protect tribes from the settlers’ uses of water.   
This dichotomy reflects a fundamentally different relationship with state law—with 
national forests there is a basic deference to state law, while with Indian reservations, federal law 
is strongly preemptive.  See, e.g., R. at 2231 (Special Master Report, Arizona I) (finding “[t]he 
suggestion is unacceptable that the United States intended that the Indians would be required to 
obtain water for their future needs by acquiring appropriative rights under state law”); U.S. v. 
McIntire, 101 F.2d 650, 654 (9th Cir. 1939) (rejecting state law as a basis for acquiring water rights 
on the Flathead Indian Reservation reasoning that “the Montana statutes regarding water rights are 
not applicable because Congress at no time has made such statutes controlling in the reservation.”); 
Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 19.03[4], at 1218 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012) 
(“States have considerable power over federal lands, and Congress has generally deferred to state 
water law relative to federal lands.  By contrast, the establishment of an Indian 





relative to Indian reservations.”) (footnotes omitted).  These differences further underscore why 
the purposes for reserved rights for national forests are narrowly construed as in New Mexico, 
while purposes for reserved rights for Indian reservations are broadly construed. 
In addition, the specific statutes concerning creation of the national forest involved in New 
Mexico are not remotely analogous to the Agreements, Executive Order, or statute concerning the 
Coeur d’Alene Reservation.  In New Mexico the Supreme Court was faced with two different 
statutes, each establishing different—and sometimes conflicting—purposes for national forests.  
438 U.S. at 712-14 (discussing the Organic Administration Act of 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 11, 36 
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 481) and the Multiple Use Sustained-Yield Act (MUSYA) of 1960, Pub. 
L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 528)).  The Organic Act provided relatively 
narrow purposes for national forests—including protecting watersheds for western water users.  
Id. at 712-13.  The MUSYA, on the other hand, provided for additional—sometimes conflicting—
purposes, including recreation, range, and fish habitat.  Id. at 713.  Reviewing the legislative 
history of the MUSYA, the Court concluded that it was intended to “broaden the benefits accruing 
from all reserved national forests,” by adding purposes “‘to be supplemental to, but not in 
derogation of, the purposes for which the national forests were established’ in the [Organic Act].”  
Id. at 714.  The Court then found that the purposes in the subsequent MUSYA were secondary, 
and Congress did not intend to reserve water for them under federal law.  Id. at 715.   
In essence, the Court in New Mexico found that Congress did not, by enacting the later 
legislation, add to the original purposes of the forest for which water was reserved.  In other words, 
New Mexico simply construed this statutory scheme to uphold the original purposes of the national 
forest.  But significantly, neither New Mexico, nor any other case, has held that a later statute has 
abrogated the original purposes for which a reservation was established and for which water was 





Reservation was created in 1873 were later abrogated without any clear expression of intent by 
Congress, must likewise be rejected.  See infra Section II. 
New Mexico, as a case construing a particular statutory scheme, also does not stand for the 
proposition that where a reservation is established for broad or multiple uses, such as an Indian 
reservation, a court must find that some of the claimed uses are “secondary” uses and be pursued 
under state law.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1410 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[n]either Cappaert 
[v. U.S., 426 U.S. 128 (1976)] nor New Mexico requires us to choose between . . . activities or 
identify a single essential purpose”).   
This Court has recognized the differing goals for Indian reservations as contrasted with 
other federal reservations.  In Potlatch Corp. v. U.S., 134 Idaho 916, 12 P.3d 1260 (2000), this 
Court explained: 
[whereas] Winters dealt with the creation of a reservation by treaty, a bargained for 
exchange between two entities[, a federal law creating other reservations, like] the 
Wilderness Act [which established the National Wilderness Preservation System], is not 
an exchange; it is an act of Congress that sets aside land, immunizing it from future 
development.  There is no principle of construction requiring the Court to interpret [it] to 
create an implied water right. 
Id. at 920.2  Both the Montana Supreme Court and Arizona Supreme Court have also recognized 
the significant differences between the creation of Indian reservations and other kinds of federal 
reservations, and both accordingly held that New Mexico does not apply in determining the 
reserved water rights on an Indian reservation.3  State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish & 
                                                 
2 See also Goodman Oil Co. of Lewiston v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 136 Idaho 53, 57, 28 P.3d 
996, 1000 (2001) (“Indian reservations are different; distinct from every other type of reservation, 
i.e., national parks, wilderness areas, military reservations, and even further, Indian reservations 
are a distinct entity within the law.”). 
3 The Ninth Circuit has indicated that New Mexico does not directly apply to Winters doctrine 
rights on Indian reservations, but nevertheless found it to provide useful guidelines.  Agua Caliente 
Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849 F.3d 1262, 1269 n.6 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(“we have previously noted that New Mexico is ‘not directly applicable to Winters doctrine rights 





Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 712 P.2d 754, 766-68 (Mont. 1985); In re General 
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River System & Source, 35 P.3d 68, 76-77 (Ariz. 
2001) (“Gila V”).  
In sum, the State’s argument that New Mexico mandates that the purposes of the Coeur 
d’Alene Reservation be narrowly construed must be rejected.  The legal principles applicable to 
Indian tribes are unique, the record here demonstrates that the purposes of the Coeur d’Alene 
Reservation are broad, and accordingly the New Mexico case provides no basis for limiting the 
waters available to ensure a viable future for this Tribe on its Reservation, which was promised to 
it forever.   
II. Congress Ratified the Broad Purposes of the Tribe’s 1873 Reservation 
Within the Boundaries Confirmed by the 1891 Act.  
The district court properly concluded that the Coeur d’Alene Reservation was established 
by Executive Order in 1873 and that federal reserved water rights were implied to fulfill not only 
the Reservation’s domestic and agricultural purposes, but also traditional fishing, hunting, and 
wildlife habitat for hunting purposes. R. at 4320-23 (Order on Mots. S.J.).4  The district court also 
correctly held that traditional fishing and hunting purposes carry a time immemorial priority date 
and agricultural purposes carry an 1873 Reservation establishment priority date.  Id. at 4326.5  The 
State does not dispute the district court’s determination that the 1873 Executive Order Reservation 
                                                 
adequate consideration to the federal Indian law principles that distinguish the situation regarding 
national forests from that involving Indian reservations, the holding in Agua Caliente does not 
support limiting tribal reserved water rights to a single, narrow purpose.  Rather, the Ninth Circuit 
held in Agua Caliente that “[t]he general purpose, to provide a home for the Indians, is a broad 
one that must be liberally construed.” Id. at 1270 (quoting Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 
647 F.2d 42, 47 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Walton I”) (emphasis in original)); see also id. at 1265 (“The 
Executive Orders establishing the reservation are short in length, but broad in purpose.”). 
4 See supra n.1. 
5 The Tribe has appealed the district court’s ruling with respect to the priority date for reserved 





included fishing and hunting purposes, but appeals the district court’s decision on the premise that 
the 1891 congressional act ratifying the 1887 and 1889 Agreements fundamentally changed the 
purposes of the 1873 Reservation, leaving agriculture as the sole purpose.6   
As noted above, such an abrogation of the Tribe’s rights to water for the purposes of the 
1873 Reservation would require a clear statement from Congress.  The 1891 Act passed by 
Congress simply states that the 1887 and 1889 Agreements are “hereby, accepted, and confirmed” 
and then sets out the provisions of each agreement.  Act of Mar. 3, 1891, Ch. 543, 26 Stat. 989, 
1027-29 (1887 Agreement), 1029-32 (1889 Agreement) (1891). This bare bones statutory 
language provides no textual support for abrogation of the purposes of the Tribe’s 1873 
Reservation.  
The same is true regarding the text of the 1887 and 1889 Agreements—which solely 
addressed land cessions from the Tribe in exchange for continued recognition of the Tribe’s 1873 
Reservation.  There is nothing in the text of the Agreements that could have been understood by 
the Tribe to mean that those Agreements were abrogating the purposes of the Reservation or taking 
away the water needed to make the Tribe’s homeland viable. 
In short, there is simply no evidence that Congress repudiated the 1873 Executive Order 
Reservation or narrowed the purposes for which it was established.  In fact, just the opposite is 
true—the Supreme Court in Idaho II squarely held that in 1891 “Congress recognized the full 
extent of the Executive Order reservation lying with the stated boundaries it ultimately 
                                                 
6 The State makes a passing reference to the “diminished Reservation” in connection with the 1891 
Act.  State Br. at 7. But “diminished” is a term of art in this context, which connotes a change in 
Reservation boundaries as a result of a statute that opened the Reservation to non-Indian 
settlement—which occurs only where Congress clearly and plainly intends such a result. See 
Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1078-79 (2016).  The Coeur d’Alene Reservation has never 
been held to be diminished, the State did not raise any diminishment issue below, and the issue is 





confirmed . . . .” 533 U.S. at 281.7  Idaho II and the historical record demonstrate continuity, not 
change, in later actions taken by both the Executive branch and Congress that recognized the 
Tribe’s 1873 Reservation and the purposes for which it was established.  
A. The Tribe’s 1873 Reservation Was Established for Broad Purposes Including 
Hunting and Fishing. 
1. The Tribe’s 1873 Reservation was established by Executive Order and must be 
treated the same as any other Indian reservation for determining its purposes. 
As correctly recounted by the district court, in Idaho II the Supreme Court found that Lake 
Coeur d’Alene and its related waterways were historically important to the Tribe for “food, fiber, 
transportation, recreation, and cultural activities.”  533 U.S. at 265; R. at 4313 (Order on Mots. 
S.J.).  These broad purposes, each tied to the Tribe’s use of water, formed the backdrop to the 
creation of the 1873 Reservation.  When the Tribe and United States reached an agreement in 
1873, the deal provided for the Tribe to relinquish claims to its aboriginal lands in exchange for 
an expanded reservation that accommodated the Tribe’s insistence on inclusion of key water 
bodies within the retained Reservation. Idaho II, 533 U.S. at 266.  Under the 1873 Agreement the 
Tribe agreed to “locate and make their homes upon the reservation.”  R. at 4202 (1873 Agreement).  
The 1873 Agreement also “preserv[ed] the water resource[s]” to sustain the Tribe’s traditional 
activities, including hunting and fishing, because it “added the rivers, lake and waters . . . which 
they demanded remain under their control.”  R. at 1589-90 (E. Richard Hart, A History of Coeur 
d’Alene Tribal Water Use (Nov. 25, 2015) (“Hart Rep. 2015”)); see also Idaho II, 533 U.S. at 274 
(“[a] right to control the lakebed and adjacent waters was traditionally important to the Tribe”); id. 
                                                 
7 Idaho II principally focused on the Tribe’s traditional water uses and activities at the time the 
reservation was created in 1873, through congressional ratification in 1891, because the issue in 
the case was title to submerged lands at the time of Idaho statehood.  Idaho II did not look more 
comprehensively at the additional purposes for which the Coeur d’Alene Reservation was created 
but nonetheless strongly supports the intent of the United States and the Tribe in reserving water 





at 275 (“the submerged lands and related water rights had been continuously important to the 
Tribe”).  In fact, the 1873 Agreement contains a provision unique to Coeur d’Alene that expressly 
protects the Tribe’s water resources by stating that “the waters running into said reservation shall 
not be turned from their natural channel where they enter said Reservation.”  R. at 4202 (1873 
Agreement).  At the same time, the Tribe was beginning to advance in the arts of civilization, 
including agriculture and industry, and the 1873 Agreement reflects an equally important focus on 
ensuring that the Tribe’s Reservation would sustain these more modern pursuits.  See U.S. v. Idaho, 
95 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1105 (D. Idaho 1998) (“Idaho II”) (1873 Reservation would include Indian 
farms and allow for a mill at the upper falls); R. at 4202 (1873 Agreement) (providing for school, 
training in commercial and industrial pursuits); R. at 1588 (Hart Rep. 2015) (Indians demanded 
extension of 1867 reservation to include Catholic mission and mill privileges). 
The State argues that the district court should not have relied on the 1873 Agreement to 
define the purposes of the Tribe’s Reservation because “by its terms, [it] was ‘null and void and 
of no effect” if not approved by Congress.” State Br. at 21.  But there is more than one way to 
create an Indian reservation, and the President soon acted to formalize the Reservation as set forth 
in the 1873 Agreement.  As the Supreme Court explained in Idaho II: 
[On November 8,] 1873 President Grant issued an Executive Order directing that the 
reservation specified in the agreement be ‘withdrawn from sale and set apart as a 
reservation for the Coeur d’Alene Indians.’ 
533 U.S. at 266 (citations omitted); R. at 1354 (Aff. of Richard J. Hart, Ex. 3 (Exec. Order of Nov. 
8, 1873)).8   
                                                 
8 The State’s own expert report also recognizes that officials within the Department of the Interior 
were already taking formal action on the 1873 Agreement prior to the commission’s 
recommendation.  See R. at 2990 n.118 (Stephen Wee, Establishment of the Coeur d’Alene Indian 
Reservation and the Transformation of Coeur d’Alene Land and Water Use, from Contact through 
Allotment, (Feb. 25, 2016) (“Wee Rep. 2016”)) (citing Letter from Edward P. Smith, Comm’r of 
Indian Affairs, to E.C. Kemble, U.S. Inspector, Olympia, Wash. Terr. (Nov. 14, 1873)).  That letter 





The State also questions the relevance of the 1873 Agreement because, after the Executive 
Order was issued, the commission that negotiated the agreement on behalf of the United States 
belatedly sent a report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs recommending that the agreement 
they entered with the Tribe not be confirmed.  State Br. at 4 (citing R. at 2989-90 (Wee Rep. 
2016)).  The commission’s report, however, was only a recommendation, and it is the formal action 
of the President in issuing the Executive Order—and not this ignored recommendation by the 
commission—that is controlling. 
And an Executive Order reservation has the full measure of legal dignity, just like any 
other—as federal law requires that an Indian reservation established by Executive Order must be 
treated the same as reservations created by treaty or other congressionally ratified agreements.  
Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 598 (“We can give but short shrift at this late date to the argument that the 
reservations either of land or water are invalid because they were originally set apart by the 
Executive.”); Parravano v. Babbitt, 70 F.3d 539, 544 (9th Cir. 1995) (“We have long held that 
when it comes to protecting tribal rights against non-federal interests, it makes no difference 
whether those rights derive from treaty, statute or executive order, unless Congress has provided 
otherwise”); U.S. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 543 F.2d 676, 687 (9th Cir. 1976) (“executive order 
reservations do not differ from treaty or statutory reservations”).  Thus, issuance of the Executive 
Order unequivocally reserved the 1873 Reservation for the Tribe’s benefit.  See Idaho II, 95 F. 
                                                 
boundaries, as stipulated in the agreement concluded with said Indians July 28, 1873” and goes on 
to note that the General Land Office was also furnished a copy and was “requested to notify the 
proper offices . . . of the setting apart of such reservation.  You will cause said Indians to be advised 
of the setting apart of this reservation and that it is the desire of this Department that they locate 
thereon without unnecessary delay.” See Letter from Edward P. Smith, Comm’r of Indian Affairs, 
to E.C. Kemble, U.S. Inspector, Olympia, Wash. Terr. at 1-2 (Nov. 14, 1873) (This historical 
document was lodged with this Court rather than included in the Clerk’s Corrected Record on 





Supp. 2d at 1114.9  As such, the Tribe’s reserved water rights vested no later than the date that the 
Reservation was established.  Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 600; U.S. v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) 
(implied tribal rights predating reservation are retained and exist from immemorial). 
And Judge Lodge in Idaho II specifically found that the Executive Order was intended to 
“create a reservation for the Coeur d’Alenes that mirrored the terms of the 1873 agreement . . . . ”  
95 F. Supp. 2d at 1109.  Judge Lodge explained that: 
at the time of the Executive reservation in 1873 the Tribe continued to be dependent on the 
Lake and rivers . . . . In no uncertain terms, the Coeur d’Alenes made it be known that their 
continued reliance on the waterways was necessary to ensure their survival . . . . [I]n 1873 
the Lake and rivers were an essential part of the “basket of resources” necessary to sustain 
the Tribe’s livelihood.  While tribal members also engaged in gardening, gathering and 
hunting, the waterways provided a reliable, year-round source of food, fibre and 
transportation without which the Tribe could not have survived.   
Id. at 1104.  Idaho II and the historical record thus show that a purpose of establishing the 1873 
Reservation was to ensure the Tribe would be able to continue its traditional activities, in addition 
to allow the Tribe to progress in agricultural, commercial and other industrial pursuits. 
2. The 1887 Agreement confirmed the purposes of the Tribe’s 1873 Reservation. 
Increasing encroachments from non-Indians caused the Tribe to be concerned that their 
1873 Reservation could be jeopardized or altered.  To guard against this, the Tribe sought 
additional negotiations with the federal government in 1885 seeking Congressional ratification of 
its 1873 Reservation.  The Tribe’s petition described its aboriginal territory and noted that “all the 
                                                 
9 The State cites to a statement by the Tribe’s expert that the “executive order was ‘seen as a 
temporary measure to fully protect the agreement until the necessary legislation could be passed 
[and] Congress confirmed the reservation.’” State Br. at 4 (citing R. at 1593 (Hart Rep. 2015)).  
The “temporary nature” of the Executive Order only meant that “[u]ntil Congress approved the 
Executive reservation . . . the Tribe’s property right was ‘subject to termination at the will of either 
the executive or Congress.’”  Idaho II, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 1110.  As discussed in this Section, 
Congress ultimately ratified and confirmed the 1873 Executive Order Reservation when it ratified 
the 1887 Agreement.  See also R. at 1809 (Hart Rep. 2015) (explaining that the 1887 Agreement, 
which Congress did ratify in the 1891 Act, confirmed the Coeur d’Alene Reservation set aside in 





lands of your petitioners, so by them owned and herein described, have been taken possession of 
by the whites without remuneration or indemnity, except that portion now by them occupied as the 
present Coeur d’Alene Reservation.” R. at 2041 (Aff. of Steven W. Strack, Ex. 4 (S. Exec. Doc. 
No. 122 (1886)) (reprinting Petition from Coeur d’Alene Tribe to President of United States (Mar. 
23, 1885)).10  In response, Congress authorized a new commission to engage in negotiations with 
the Tribe in 1886, and this enactment expressly recognized establishment of the Tribe’s 1873 
Reservation.  R. at 1366 (Aff. of Richard J. Hart, Ex. 4 (Report of Comm’r of Indian Affairs, to 
Sec’y of Interior at 18 (Dec. 13, 1887)) (an act “to enable said Secretary to negotiate with the 
Coeur d’Alene Indians for the cession of their lands outside the limits of the present Coeur d’Alene 
reservation to the United States”) (emphasis added).  As the Supreme Court in Idaho II explained:  
Congress was free to define the reservation boundaries however it saw fit . . . [but] 
Congress in any event made it expressly plain that its object was to obtain tribal interests 
only by tribal consent.  When in 1886 Congress took steps toward extinguishing aboriginal 
title to all lands outside the 1873 boundaries, it did so by authorizing negotiation of 
agreements ceding title for compensation.  
533 U.S. at 277 (emphasis added). In other words, the clear understanding of Congress in 1886 
was that the Tribe then held a Reservation that was established in 1873 and that any “Tribal 
interests” to be obtained would require the consent of the Tribe. 
                                                 
10 The petition also described the vast resources included in the Tribe’s territory and discussed 
various items that the Tribe needed, like “grist and saw mills, proper farming implements, and 
mechanics to help to teach us . . . industrial pursuits”  R. at 2042 (1885 Petition).  These items 
were not in derogation of the Tribe’s traditional pursuits—rather they were listed in the context of 
compensation to settle the Tribe’s claims to lands outside its current reservation—as the petition 
explained it specifically sought to enter  
proper business negotiations under and by which your petitioners may be properly and fully 
compensated for such portion of their lands not now reserved to them; that their present 
reserve may be confirmed . . . and that ample provision be made by the United States by 
which their compensation shall be annually made them partly in stock, tools, mills, and 
mechanical instruction by proper mechanics, for the permanent benefit of every member, 






Under the 1887 Agreement arising out of those negotiations, the Tribe once again agreed 
to cede lands outside the “Coeur d’Alene Reservation”11 and the Agreement confirmed that the 
Reservation “shall be held forever as Indian lands and as homes for the Coeur d’Alene Indians.” 
R. at 1391 (1887 Agreement, art. 5).  The 1887 Agreement unequivocally confirms the Tribe’s 
1873 Reservation and shows that the cession of lands was the only “Tribal interest” that the Tribe 
consented to relinquish.   
The State refers to statements made by Coeur d’Alene Chief Andrew Seltice regarding 
agricultural endeavors prior to and during negotiations of the 1887 Agreement.  State Br. at 22.  
But statements about agriculture are far short of the clear statement from Congress that is required 
to abrogate Tribal rights within the 1873 Reservation.  Pocatello, 145 Idaho at 506-07.  Further, 
these statements must be understood in context.  In the 1887 Agreement, the United States sought 
a cession of land—there was no effort to strip from the Tribe the ability to use water for the broad 
purposes for which the Reservation was established in 1873, which include traditional activities.  
At most, the statements cited by the State support the continued recognition of the Tribe’s efforts 
to engage in the agricultural and more modern pursuits within its 1873 Reservation, while at the 
same time maintaining its traditional activities.   
                                                 
11 In fact, much of the 1887 negotiating history is limited to obtaining a cession of lands outside 
the Tribe’s Reservation and the terms of compensation for that cession.  In this respect the 1887 
Agreement is substantially similar to the 1873 Agreement, which the federal negotiators used as a 
reference.  R. at 1383 (Aff. of Richard J. Hart, Ex. 4 (Report of Nw. Indian Comm’n, to Comm’r 
of Indian Affairs at 53 (1887))).  For example, like the 1873 Agreement, the 1887 Agreement 
provided that the federal government would expend federal funds to “erect[] on said reservation a 
saw and grist mill, to be operated by steam, and an engineer and miller . . . [and to] best promote 
the progress, comfort, improvement, education, and civilization of said Coeur d’Alene Indians . . 
. .”  R. at 1391 (1887 Agreement, art. 6).  These provisions show that it was important to the Tribe 
that the federal government fulfill the promises made in the 1873 Agreement and provide the 
resources necessary for the Tribe to realize the agricultural, commercial and industrial 
advancements it previously sought for its Reservation economy; thereby reflecting continuity, not 





In fact, the Tribe continued to engage in traditional activities throughout this time period,12 
and the historical record makes clear that during negotiations, Chief Seltice insisted on the 
continued protection of its 1873 Reservation and implored the commission to “preserve for us and 
our children forever this reservation . . . [because] neither money nor land outside do we value 
compared with this reservation.  Make the paper strong; make it so strong that we and all the 
Indians living on it shall have it forever.”  R. at 2157 (Aff. of Steven Strack, Ex. 10 (Council with 
Coeur d’Alenes at 78 (Mar. 25, 1887))).  As discussed above, the 1887 Agreement must be 
construed as it would have been understood by the Indians.  Pocatello, 145 Idaho at 506.  The 
Tribe simply could not have understood an agreement that was fortifying its 1873 Reservation and 
ceding lands outside the Reservation as somehow—and without saying so—limiting all Tribal life 
on the Reservation to pursuing agricultural endeavors to the exclusion of all else.   
Idaho II reinforces that the purposes of the Reservation remained unchanged.  Given the 
Tribe’s traditional reliance on its waters, the Supreme Court in Idaho II found that “Idaho 
[correctly] also conceded . . . that after Secretary of the Interior’s 1888 report that the [1873] 
reservation embraced nearly ‘all the navigable waters of Lake Coeur D’Alene’ . . . Congress was 
on notice that the Executive Order reservation included submerged lands.”  Id. at 275.  Importantly, 
                                                 
12 During the years prior to the 1887 Agreement, the Tribe continued to engage in traditional 
activities.  For example, due to increasing conflicts in the late 1870s between non-Indians and 
other Indian tribes, like the Nez Perce, the Coeur d’Alenes engaged in traditional gathering, 
sometimes under the protection of tribal soldiers.  R. at 1615 (Hart Rep. 2015) (“At the time of the 
outbreak of the Nez Perce War, the Coeur d’Alenes were digging camas near St. Maries. . . .”).  
Around 1878, in order to protect their land and water resources within their Reservation 
boundaries, the Tribe decided to move many, but not all, of their villages and homes closer to the 
De Smet area near their traditional camas grounds.  Id. at 1615, 1621-23. See also R. at 653 (Ian 
Smith, Historical Examination of the Purposes for the Creation of the Coeur d’Alene Indian 
Reservation (2015)) (“Most Coeur d’Alene villages [on lakes and rivers] remained in use until at 
least the 1870s, with some retaining ‘a permanent population as late as 1900.’”); R. at 2669-72 (Jt. 
Stmt. Facts) (summarizing continuance of traditional activities after 1873).  Into the 1880s, “the 
Tribe . . . continued to use their traditional fishing spots and to remain true to tribal culture.” R. at 





the Supreme Court found that “the Tribe was understood [by Congress] to be entitled beneficially 
to the reservation as then defined.”  Id. at 267 (emphasis added).  The Court would not have ruled 
that the Tribe owned the submerged lands in Idaho II if by the time of Idaho statehood in 1890, 
the Tribe no longer needed these submerged lands for hunting, fishing, and other traditional 
activities.  
3. The 1889 Agreement and 1891 Act ratified the purposes of the 1873 
Reservation within the boundaries confirmed by Congress. 
This same pattern was repeated two years later.  The 1889 Agreement—like the 1887 
Agreement—only involved a cession of land, not an abrogation of rights on the portion of the 1873 
Reservation that the Tribe retained.  Indeed, the Supreme Court concluded in Idaho II that in 
authorizing additional negotiations with the Tribe in the 1889 Appropriation Act, Congress “did 
not simply alter the 1873 boundaries unilaterally.  Instead, the Tribe was understood [by Congress] 
to be entitled beneficially to the reservation as then defined” and Congress only sought an 
additional land cession within the Tribe’s 1873 Reservation that the Tribe “shall consent to sell.”  
Idaho II, 533 U.S. at 277.13  Accordingly, rather than suggesting any congressional intent to defeat 
or limit the purposes of the Tribe’s 1873 Reservation, Congress’s instructions confirm that 
negotiations were limited and sought only a voluntary cession of land within the Tribe’s 
Reservation—not any effort to abrogate Tribal rights within the boundaries it ratified.  Idaho II, 
533 U.S. at 280-81 (“[t]here is no indication that Congress ever modified its objective of negotiated 
consensual transfer” and “[a]ny imputation to Congress either of bad faith or of secrecy in dropping 
its express objective . . . is at odds with the evidence.”).  
                                                 
13 The Ninth Circuit similarly found in Idaho II that Congress’s “1889 Authorization of 
negotiations with the Tribe for a cession of tribal property constituted recognition and validation 





Here again, the State incorrectly suggests that statements made during the 1889 
negotiations relating to the Tribe’s agricultural endeavors somehow implicitly abrogated the 
Tribe’s traditional reliance on its waterways and water resources within its 1873 Reservation.  State 
Br. at 22-23.  But the law does not allow such a backhanded loss of Tribal rights.  While the 
statements cited by the State may reflect an awareness that the Tribe was advancing in agriculture 
(which the district court properly found was another purpose of establishing the 1873 Reservation), 
none of the statements indicates that the Tribe or the federal government understood the 1889 
Agreement as abrogating or relinquishing any of the purposes for which the 1873 Reservation was 
created.  See Pocatello, 145 Idaho at 506-07.  
Moreover, while the State’s recitations from the record are limited to agriculture, that is 
only one part of a much fuller history.  The record also shows that retaining the 1873 Reservation, 
including the Lake and associated waterways, remained a central concern to the Tribe.  Throughout 
the 1889 negotiations, Coeur d’Alene leaders insisted upon ratification of the 1887 Agreement, 
which confirmed their 1873 Reservation.  See, e.g., R. at 1357 (Aff. of Richard J. Hart, Ex. 4 
(Report of Comm’r of Indian Affairs, to Sec’y of Interior at 3 (Dec. 7, 1889))) (“[T]he 
Indians . . . absolutely refused to entertain any proposition [to relinquish some of their 
Reservation] until the old agreement was ratified.”).  The Tribe also expressed fears of losing their 
homes and the importance of their lands and waters.  See, e.g., Idaho II, 533 U.S at 270; R. at 2115 
(Third Council with Coeur d’Alene Indians (Aug. 31, 1889) (Chief Seltice stating that “I, as an 
Indian, like my land; am very anxious to have land; I do not care about money”).  In response to 
the Tribe’s concerns, when explaining the new boundary line under the 1889 Agreement, “General 
Simpson, a negotiator for the United States, reassured the Tribe that ‘you still have the St. Joseph 





along the St. Joseph River.” 210 F.3d at 1071 n.6.14  And during this time the Tribe was continuing 
to engage in traditional activities, notwithstanding its continued agricultural and other pursuits.15   
This history shows that the Tribe remained concerned about protecting its land and water 
resources and that the federal government recognized it could not obtain an additional cession of 
land without ensuring that the Tribe’s 1873 Reservation was ratified—albeit with a boundary 
adjustment in the northern portion.  See Pocatello, 145 Idaho at 506. (“‘[I]t is the intention of the 
parties, and not solely that of the superior side, that must control any attempt to interpret the 
treaties.’”) (alteration in original).  As Judge Lodge found in Idaho II, “the placement of the 
boundary line [under the 1889 Agreement] was for the purpose of establishing the Tribe’s rights 
to the Lake and rivers.”  95 F. Supp. 2d at 1115.  The record demonstrates that water remained a 
central feature of the negotiations throughout this period, and that while certain lands were ceded, 
all of the Tribe’s rights within the boundaries of the 1873 Reservation ratified by Congress were 
retained by the Tribe.  Certainly, there was no clear expression, or agreement of the Indians, to any 
loss of water rights. See Pocatello, 145 Idaho at 506-07. 
Idaho II underscores this conclusion—that apart from ceding certain lands, the Tribe 
retained all other rights on the Reservation that remained.  The Supreme Court found that the 1891 
                                                 
14 The State seizes on “the meadow and agricultural land” references as nullifying the continued 
importance of the Tribe’s traditional activities within the 1873 Reservation. State Br. at 23.  This 
ignores the broader context of the statement in which General Simpson also referenced that the 
Tribe would retain the Lake and other important waterways that were traditionally important to 
the Tribe. The Ninth Circuit in Idaho II for example, found that “[t]he Tribe’s chief insisted on 
carefully defining the new proposed boundaries, rejecting the suggestion that the ‘lake belongs to 
[the Tribe] as well as to the whites.’” 210 F.3d at 1071 n.6 (alteration in original).   
15 See, e.g., R. at 788 (Ian Smith, A Response to the Expert Report of Stephen Wee Regarding the 
Establishment of and Purposes for the Coeur d’Alene Indian Reservation (May 26, 2016) (“Smith 
Rep. 2016”)) (federal officials reported that during the 1880s and 1890s the Tribe “continued to 
rely on hunting, fishing, and gathering activities on their traditionally occupied lands” and in 1888 
Commissioner J.D.C. Atkins reported that Coeur d’Alene Tribal members “occasionally go [to the 





Act ratifying the Tribe’s Reservation “contained no cession by the Tribe of submerged lands within 
the reservation’s outer boundaries” and noted that “the intent [of the 1889 Appropriations 
Act] . . . was that anything not consensually ceded by the Tribe would remain for the Tribe’s 
benefit . . . .”  533 U.S. at 278 (emphasis added).16  So despite agreeing to an additional cession in 
the 1889 Agreement, the Tribe did not relinquish any of its rights within the boundaries of its 
remaining 1873 Reservation. 17   See also Idaho II, 210 F.3d at 1073 (“[w]e conclude that 
Congress’s actions [show] . . . express recognition, and acceptance of the [1873] executive 
reservation”);18 id. at 1076 (given the Tribe’s dependence on traditional activities “[i]n 1889, the 
borders of the reservation were contracted and redrawn—but redrawn so as to ensure that the Tribe 
still had beneficial ownership of the southern third of the Lake as well as the portion of the St. Joe 
River within the 1873 reservation”).19   
                                                 
16 See also 210 F.3d at 1077 (in the 1889 act authorizing additional negotiations, the “express 
reference to the reservation as the Tribe’s reservation, explicit recognition that the choice to sell 
was the Tribe’s . . . all manifest an awareness and acceptance by Congress of the boundaries of the 
1873 reservation”) (emphasis in original). 
17 After ratification and despite the pressures faced by the Tribe and its adaptation to civilized and 
industrial pursuits, the Tribe continued to rely on traditional pursuits as part of their regular lives.  
In July of 1891, for example, when the resident farmer at Coeur d’Alene attempted to get a census 
of the Indians on the Reservation he “complained about the difficulty of obtaining an ‘accurate’ 
census of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe because many tribal members had ‘gone to the mountains 
hunting and fishing which made it impossible to see them all.’”  R. at 788 (Smith Rep. 2016).   
18 The Ninth Circuit noted that “[t]he State has not challenged the district court’s factual findings, 
nor has it challenged the court’s conclusion that executive actions reflect a clear intent to include 
submerged lands within the 1873 reservation.” Idaho II, 210 F.3d at 1070.  As such, the Ninth 
Circuit “accept[ed] the facts as given” but also found that the facts “are amply supported by the 
record.” Id. at 1073. 
19 The absence of express statements “in the Agreements or in the negotiations [regarding] 
hunting and fishing” is not indicative of an express intent to change to a purely agrarian society 
nor does finding a hunting and fishing purpose result in a casus omissus as the State argues, 
because as discussed, both Agreements were premised on the original purposes of the 1873 
Reservation being confirmed.  See State Br. at 16 (citing Choctaw Nation v. U.S., 318 U.S. 423, 
432 (1943)), 24 (“the Court need not, and should not, supply a casus omissus by implying a 





In sum, the Tribe’s efforts to establish a Reservation in 1873 that would, in part, protect its 
broad traditional uses of Lake Coeur d’Alene and related waterways, combined with the federal 
government’s recognition that it could only achieve its goals in securing peace and land cessions 
from the Tribe by agreeing to the Tribe’s demands, are the foundations upon which the Supreme 
Court concluded in Idaho II that the Tribe owned submerged lands within the Reservation 
boundaries confirmed by Congress in 1891.  533 U.S. at 275-76.  The 1887 and 1889 Agreements 
evidence a continued recognition by both the Executive and Congress of the Tribe’s dependence 
on its water resources for traditional purposes, which served as the cornerstone of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Idaho II.   
B. The State Is Precluded from Relitigating Issues the Supreme Court 
Previously Rejected in Idaho II. 
This is not the first time that the State has argued that the purposes of the Reservation are 
limited to agriculture by virtue of the 1887 and 1889 Agreements and the 1891 Act.  The State 
made that very same argument in Idaho II—and the Supreme Court firmly rejected it.  Accordingly, 
the State is precluded from asserting that the Tribe’s Reservation as ratified by Congress in 1891 
is limited to an agricultural purpose.20  “The preclusive effect of a federal-court judgment is 
determined by federal common law.” Stilwyn, Inc. v. Rokan Corp., 158 Idaho 833, 839, 353 P.3d 
1067, 1073 (2015) (citing Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 891 (2008)).  Under the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel, the Supreme Court has explained that “once a court has decided an issue of 
fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision is conclusive in a subsequent suit based on a 
different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation.” U.S. v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 
158 (1984) (citing Montana v. U.S., 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 
                                                 
20 The Tribe raised the preclusive effect of the State’s arguments below, R. at 3120-32 (Tribe’s 
Resp. to State, et al.), but the district court did not address this issue in reaching its decision on the 





U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979) (“judgment in the prior suit precludes relitigation of issues actually 
litigated and necessary to the outcome of the first action”).21   
The dispositive issues in Idaho II were whether Congress was on notice that the Executive 
Order reservation included submerged lands and whether the purposes of the reservation would 
have been compromised if submerged lands passed to the State upon statehood.  Idaho II, 533 U.S. 
at 273-74.22 To resolve these issues, Idaho II determined whether the federal government knew in 
establishing the Tribe’s Reservation that the Tribe depended on the waters and submerged lands 
to support its traditional ways of life.  95 F. Supp. 2d at 1098-1100.  The State took the position in 
Idaho II that the purposes of the 1873 Reservation changed over time and “[t]he 1889 Act was not 
an affirmation of the 1873 Executive Order Reservation or its purposes; it was a mandate to 
radically alter the Reservation to meet the changing needs of the Tribe.”  R. at 4149 (Second Aff. 
of Vanessa Boyd Willard, Ex. 3 (Br. for Pet’r, Idaho v. U.S., 533 U.S. 262 (2001) (No. 00-189), 
2001 WL 76238, at *46)).  The State also argued that the 1873 reservation was “only a temporary 
set-aside,” R. at 4182, (Second Aff. of Vanessa Boyd Willard, Ex. 4 (State of Idaho’s Trial Br. at 
29, U.S. v. Idaho, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D. Idaho 1998) (No. CIV 94-328-N-ELJ)), and that 
Congress “repudiated” the 1873 Reservation and created a new Reservation with an agricultural 
purpose through the 1889 appropriation and 1891 ratification acts, R. at 4146 (Br. of Pet’r at *37).  
                                                 
21 In applying collateral estoppel to an issue of fact or an issue of law, the Supreme Court has stated 
that for the purpose of determining when to apply an estoppel, 
[w]hen the claims in two separate actions between the same parties are the same or are 
closely related . . . it is not ordinarily necessary to characterize an issue as one of fact or of 
law for purposes of issue preclusion. . . . In such a case, it is unfair to the winning party 
and an unnecessary burden on the courts to allow repeated litigation of the same issue in 
what is essentially the same controversy, even if the issue is regarded as one of “law.”  
U.S. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 171 (1984) (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments § 28 cmt. b (1982) (alteration and ellipses in original). 





The State further asserted that under the 1889 Appropriation Act, the purposes of the Reservation 
were limited to agriculture, stating that the “language of the Act directs the Secretary to protect 
the Tribe’s agricultural lands, reflecting the fact that the primary purpose of the continuing 
Reservation was to protect the Tribe’s agricultural activities.”  Id. at 4149 (Br. of Pet’r at *46).  
Likewise, the State argued that in connection with the 1887 Agreement, the “reports submitted to 
Congress . . . uniformly portrayed the Coeur d’Alene Indians as farmers.”  Id.; see also Idaho II, 
210 F.3d at 1074 (“Idaho argues that none of the events leading up to its statehood in 1890 
constitute affirmative ratification of the executive intent to convey or reserve the submerged lands 
and thus cannot show congressional intent to defeat state title to these lands.”).   
The federal courts in Idaho II rejected these very arguments, holding instead that Congress 
fully ratified the Tribe’s 1873 Executive Order Reservation and the Tribe retained all rights and 
privileges not expressly ceded in the 1887 and 1889 Agreements ratified by Congress under the 
1891 Act.  In arguing here that the 1891 Act superseded the purposes of the 1873 Executive Order 
and resulted in a “reduced reservation . . . to fulfill the Tribe’s desire to establish a permanent 
livelihood based primarily on agriculture,” State Br. at 18, 20,23 the State attempts to relitigate 
issues already decided against it in Idaho II.  If the State were correct in its position, the Supreme 
Court in Idaho II would have ruled against the Tribe and the United States on the submerged lands 
issue. 
The State tries to evade Idaho II by claiming that the federal courts in Idaho II did not 
“address whether Congress, in establishing new Reservation boundaries in [the] Act of March 3, 
1891 . . . adopted the Executive Order’s purpose or intended to encourage new purposes and 
                                                 
23 The State argues here that there was a “‘change in condition’ that occurred as a result of the 
1887 and 1889 Agreements” and that the negotiating history of both the 1887 and 1889 
Agreements “establishes that the primary purpose of the [1891] Act was to encourage the Tribe in 





uses . . . .” Id. at 7.  But the State made the same contention in Idaho II, and the Supreme Court 
expressly rejected the assertion that the United States changed its intent to preserve the Tribe’s 
traditional activities as a specific purpose of the Reservation through the 1891 Act.  Idaho II, 533 
U.S. at 278 (“nor . . . is there any hint in the evidence that delay in final passage of the ratifying 
Act was meant to pull a fast one by allowing the reservation’s submerged lands to pass to Idaho”).  
The State’s attempt to circumvent the preclusive effect of Idaho II must therefore fail. 
C. Winters Does Not Establish a Rule That Later Agreements Establish New 
and Narrower Purposes of an Indian Reservation.  
As we have demonstrated above, the governing legal principles, the terms of all the 
Agreements, and the history of the negotiations involving this Reservation all clearly demonstrate 
that the State’s argument cannot be sustained—as, contrary to the State’s contentions, there was 
continuity in the broad purposes of the Reservation throughout this period, and because they were 
never abrogated by Congress, those broad purposes remained intact.  In a final effort to evade this 
conclusion, the State points to Winters, claiming that Winters somehow created a rule that means 
that the congressional act approving the 1887 and 1889 Agreements superseded the purposes of 
the 1873 Coeur d’Alene Reservation and narrowed those purposes to agriculture only. State Br. at 
18-20. 
But the State is reading far too much into a passing discussion in Winters regarding the 
background history of that Reservation.  First, Winters was a narrow suit for an injunction, 207 
U.S. at 565, and the Court did not reach any issue concerning the full scope of Fort Belknap 
Reservation purposes, or whether a later statute superseded an earlier one regarding Reservation 
purposes.  Having not addressed those issues even with regard to the Fort Belknap Reservation, 
Winters cannot be understood to have established a broader rule that applies to all Indian 





be viewed on its merits, and nothing in Winters remotely suggests that Congress could not preserve 
the original purposes of a Reservation in subsequent enactments – as occurred here.  Likewise, 
nothing in Winters can fairly be read to overcome the established principles of federal law that 
govern this area – that reserved water rights vest no later than when the Reservation is created, 
Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 600, and those rights cannot be abrogated absent clear action by Congress, 
Pocatello, 145 Idaho at 506.  Indeed, since the Supreme Court has expressed those principles 
repeatedly after Winters, there is simply no basis for suggesting that Winters overcomes or defeats 
those principles.  Here, those principles compel the determination that the broad purposes of the 
1873 Reservation remain intact. 24 
 
Indeed, the record in this case and the determinations of the Supreme Court in Idaho II 
discussed in Section II.A supra, conclusively establish that in the 1887 and 1889 Agreements as 
ratified by Congress, the Tribe intended to preserve all of the purposes it bargained for within the 
boundaries of the 1873 Reservation.  Thus, even if Winters were read as determining that the 1888 
Agreement creating the Fort Belknap Reservation superseded all the Tribes’ prior rights under 
earlier statutes and Executive Orders pertaining to that Reservation’s lands, State Br. at 20, that 
would furnish no basis to generalize that reading to Coeur d’Alene or any other Indian reservation 
where the history of dealings between the Tribe and the United States is different.25   
                                                 
24 The State also briefly cites Winters and Arizona I as establishing a principle that reservations 
are established by looking forward only to what the parties anticipated would be the Tribe’s 
permanent means of livelihood.  State Br. at 19  Even assuming the State’s reading is correct—
which it is not because Winters and its progeny look to present and future uses—here, the historical 
record shows that the Tribe’s 1873 Reservation was established to not only protect the Tribe’s 
traditional activities, but also allow the Tribe to advance in agricultural, industrial, and commercial 
pursuits that would sustain a permanent home into the future.  See Section II.A supra. 
25 The State also attempts to use In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Big Horn 
River System, 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988) (“Big Horn I”), to further support its position.  State Br. 





The State also relies on dicta from British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of 
Equalization, 299 U.S. 159 (1936), a case that dealt with the Blackfeet Reservation. State Br. at 
20.  British-American had nothing to do with reserved water rights, or the purposes for which the 
Blackfeet (or any other Reservation) was created.  Instead, it dealt with which of two different 
statutory schemes applied to minerals held by the Blackfeet Tribe on allotted lands on that 
reservation—and ultimately whether Congress had authorized state taxation of those minerals.  299 
U.S.  at 161.  The Court found that to resolve this issue, an 1896 act, under which certain 
reservation lands had been ceded, rather than prior executive orders, was the only relevant action.  
Id. at 162-63.  But this determination was based on the particular history of the Blackfeet Tribe 
and the minerals issue before the court, see Blackfeet Nation v. U.S., 81 Ct.Cl. 101, 128-29 (1935), 
which has no application here. 
III. The Tribe’s Reserved Water Rights to Instream Flows Have Never Been 
Abrogated and Continue to Exist Within the Reservation Regardless of 
Underlying Land Ownership.  
The Tribe’s reserved water rights to instream flows exist to fulfill the purposes of the Coeur 
d’Alene Reservation by supporting fish species the Tribe harvests within the Reservation.  R. at 
10 (Tribal Claims Letter from Vanessa Boyd Willard, Envt. & Natural Res. Div., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Gary Spackman, Dir., Idaho Dep’t of Water Res. (Jan. 30, 2014)).  Fish need water 
throughout a continuous and uninterrupted stream to survive, not just in discrete segments on 
                                                 
decision in a takings case, determined that the Wind River Reservation was created for “a sole 
agricultural purpose.”  Id. at 96-97 (citing U.S. v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111, 118 
(1938) (finding a purpose on the part of the U.S. “to help to create an independent farming 
community upon the reservation”)).  Significantly, and unlike the facts before this Court, the court 
in Big Horn I found no “extraneous evidence . . . sufficient to attribute a broader purpose,” 
including no showing of “a dependency upon fishing for a livelihood nor a traditional lifestyle 
involving fishing.” Id. at 98, 99.  Unlike the prior Supreme Court decision that Big Horn I relied 
on, here the Supreme Court in Idaho II previously considered and rejected the State’s argument 
that the Reservation was created solely “to protect the Tribe’s agricultural activities.”  R. at 4149 
(Br. of Pet’r at *46).  In short, the Wind River Reservation, and the history of the tribes for which 





Tribal lands.  R. at 2676-78 (Jt. Stmt. Facts. ¶¶101-06).  The Tribe’s claims to instream flows 
continue to be necessary to fulfill the fishing purposes of the Reservation even after some lands 
were alienated from Tribal ownership.  Id.  The State contends that the district court should have 
determined that the Tribe’s non-consumptive water rights for instream flows to protect fish on 
Reservation lands in Tribal ownership did not survive the 1906 Allotment Act with respect to lands 
alienated to non-Indians.  State Br. at 24-28.  From this flawed premise, the State claims that the 
Tribe’s reserved water rights to instream flows “survive the sale of surplus lands only if the United 
States either: (1) acts to explicitly retain water rights on the alienated land; or (2) in rare cases, 
holds sufficient property back from the alienation to imply the reservation of the right to control 
uses of the alienated lands as necessary for the use and enjoyment of the retained property.”  State 
Br. at 29.   
The State mischaracterizes the Tribe’s reserved water rights to instream flows as a claim 
by the Tribe to “control” uses of lands on the Reservation owned by non-Indians.  But the Tribe’s 
instream flow water rights exist to fulfill the purposes of its Reservation and do not entail any 
ownership claims to lands held by non-Indians.  Instead, these water rights consist of the right to 
prevent junior appropriators from withdrawing water and reducing instream flows in a manner that 
adversely impacts the fishery in Coeur d’Alene Lake and other waterways on the Reservation.  
This Tribal reserved water right is no different in its effect than any other senior water right.   
The State also misstates the law when it claims that the Tribe’s water rights “ceased” on 
alienated land unless Congress acts expressly to retain those rights.  To the contrary, federal law 
provides that the Tribe’s water rights continue to exist unless Congress clearly acts to abrogate 
those rights.  Dion, 476 U.S. at 737-38; see also Pocatello, 145 Idaho at 506.  Here, there has been 





A. The Tribe’s Instream Flow Water Rights Fulfill the Purposes of the 
Reservation. 
The district court correctly found that a purpose of the Reservation was to “facilitate its 
traditional . . . fishing practices,” and accordingly upheld the Tribe’s claims to non-consumptive 
instream flows (or “instream flows”) within the Reservation to fulfill that purpose.  R. at 4322 
(Order Mots. S.J.); 4482 (Order on Mot. to Set Aside & Modify).  Likewise, the district court 
correctly determined that the Tribe’s reserved right to this water turns on the purposes of the 
Reservation, not on the ownership of the lands over which the water flows. 
A non-consumptive reserved water right, like the Tribe’s instream flow claims, is a right 
to prevent others from appropriating water, not to possess a body of water.  Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 
135, 143; Adair, 723 F.2d at 1411 (instream flow water right prevents appropriators “from 
depleting the streams[’] waters below a protected level in any area where the non-consumptive 
right applies”).  This water right does not require the use of alienated land, nor is it an exercise of 
the Tribe’s regulatory authority to control non-Indian uses on such land.   
 
Unlike consumptive uses, which support the productive use of a particular piece of land 
and are only exercised by the diversion and consumption of water, non-consumptive rights 
preserve a certain amount of water in a hydrological system and are not exercised by consuming 
water.  Adair, 723 F.2d at 1411 (citing Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 143).  The Tribe holds its reserved 
instream flow water rights, not for the purposes of exercising any property interest in land that has 
been alienated to non-Indians within the Reservation, but to support the exercise of its historic 
traditional rights to fish on the Reservation, which rights cannot be sold or alienated to third parties.  
Adair, 723 F.2d at 1418 (“it follows that no subsequent transferee may acquire that [non-
consumptive] right of use or the reserved water necessary to fulfill that use”) (emphasis added).  





such as fishing, and the water rights needed to fulfill these purposes were reserved and legally 
attached as an appurtenance to the Reservation.  See John v. U.S., 720 F.3d 1214, 1229-30 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (“[j]udicial references to such [water] rights being ‘appurtenant’ to reserved 
lands . . . refer not to some physical attachment of water to land, but to the legal doctrine that 
attaches water rights to land”).  For that reason, the Tribe’s instream flow rights are not affected 
by the underlying ownership of lands on the Reservation.   
The State’s position also contradicts Idaho law and general principles of prior 
appropriation.26  Notwithstanding the federal source of the right, the effect of the Tribe’s instream 
flows on landowners is no different than any other senior water right in the State.  In Joyce 
Livestock Co. v. U.S., 144 Idaho 1, 156 P.3d 502 (2006), this Court held that a landowner had an 
appurtenant water right in a stream crossing land it did not own, because land does not need to 
have a “physical relationship” to a water right.  Id. at 12; cf. John, 720 F.3d at 1229-30.  In Joyce, 
this Court rejected the notion that the property right to exclude others from land is a basis for a 
water right under Idaho law.  144 Idaho at 7.  Joyce found that a water right “is not based upon 
having exclusive access to a water source,” and that the right “does not constitute ownership of 
the water.”  Id.  
Indeed, “[a] water right is an independent right and is not a servitude upon some other 
thing . . . .”  Bennett v. Twin Falls N. Side Land & Water Co., 27 Idaho 643, 150 P. 336, 339 
(1915).  
A riparian proprietor in the state of Idaho has no right in or claim to the waters of a stream 
flowing by or through his lands that he can successfully assert as being prior or superior to 
                                                 
26 Moreover, the State itself claims minimum stream flows in waters that flow over land it does 
not own, such as the State’s claim in Wolf Lodge Creek.  See Notice of Claim to a Water Right 
Acquired Under State Law No. 95-7874, at 2 (Jan. 28, 2013) (stating that the State does not 
“own the property listed above as place of use” for its claim to minimum stream flows in Wolf 
Lodge Creek), available at http://www.idwr.idaho.gov/apps/ExtSearch/DocsImages/ 





the rights and claims of one who has appropriated or diverted the water of the stream and 
is applying it to a beneficial use.  
Hutchinson v. Watson Slough Ditch Co., 16 Idaho 484, 101 P. 1059, 1062 (1909).  In Idaho’s 
appropriative water right system, a junior water right holder upstream of a senior user has no right, 
by virtue of land ownership, to stop the water flowing over his or her land from satisfying the 
downstream senior right.  See, e.g., Knutson v. Huggins, 62 Idaho 662, 115 P.2d 421, 424 (1941) 
(landowner cannot divert water to the detriment of a senior water right and “must allow the water 
to flow down the bed of the natural channel”). Likewise, underlying private land ownership 
provides no basis to defeat the Tribe’s instream flow water rights under federal law. 
Three federal court decisions clearly hold that instream flow reserved water rights are 
implied to fulfill the purposes of a reservation without regard to underlying land ownership.  
Walton I, 647 F.2d at 45, 48, 52; Adair, 723 F.2d at 1411-12; U.S. v. Anderson, 591 F. Supp. 1, 5, 
13 (E.D. Wash. 1982), rev’d in part on other grounds, 736 F.2d 1358.  These cases establish that 
the Tribe’s reserved instream flow water rights were not affected by allotment and are held 
regardless of the ownership over which the waters flow.  The State’s attempts to distinguish these 
cases are all unavailing and should be rejected. 
In Walton I, the Ninth Circuit addressed non-consumptive water rights in a non-navigable 
stream flowing over lands within the reservation established for the Colville Confederated Tribes.  
647 F.2d at 44-45.  The Tribe lost these lands under the General Allotment Act and a non-Indian 
owned three of the seven allotments at issue.  Id. at 45.  Notwithstanding allotment and non-Indian 
ownership, the court held that the Tribe continued to hold reserved instream flow water rights 
within the Reservation to support the Tribe’s traditional fishing activities, including where water 





The State argues that Walton I “establishes only that when tribal allotments form the 
majority of lands in an isolated stream basin, the Tribe may be entitled to an instream flow water 
right to support fish spawning on those portions of the creek running through tribal lands.”  State 
Br. at 40.  In fact, the court’s conclusion in Walton I has nothing to do with the preponderance of 
land ownership on the Reservation or in the watershed involved.  Rather, it establishes that 
instream flows are implied to support fish habitat for spawning, because “preservation of the tribe’s 
access to fishing grounds was one purpose for the creation of the Colville Reservation.”  647 F.2d 
at 48.  As the Ninth Circuit determined in a later opinion involving this dispute after remand, the 
quantity of Colville’s reserved water right to instream flows “was not affected by the allotment of 
reservations lands and passage of title out of the Indians’ hands.”  Colville Confederated Tribes v. 
Walton, 752 F.2d 397, 400 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Walton III”). 
In Adair, the Ninth Circuit found that the Klamath Tribe’s 1864 Treaty recognized the 
Tribe’s aboriginal water rights and confirmed a continued water right to support the Tribe’s fishing 
lifestyle on its reservation, even after the Tribe’s reservation was first allotted and subsequently 
terminated by Congress.  723 F.2d at 1398, 1412.  The State emphasizes that the Termination Act 
included a provision that nothing was intended to abrogate the water rights of the Tribe.  Id. at 
1412 (cited in State Br. at 38).  However, Adair’s holding was not premised solely on this 
provision, but also on the fact that nowhere in the Termination Act had Congress explicitly 
abrogated the Tribe’s reserved water rights.  Id.  (“Because Congress in section 564m of the 
Termination Act explicitly protected tribal water rights and nowhere in the act explicitly denied 
them, we can only conclude that such rights survived termination.”) (emphasis added).   
The State also gives but passing reference to the fact that, like the Coeur d’Alene 
Reservation, the Klamath Reservation was allotted, an event that the Ninth Circuit found 





Unlike the Klamath Termination Act, the Allotment Act contained no savings clause, yet the Ninth 
Circuit found that the Tribe reserved instream flow water rights and none of those rights passed to 
out of tribal ownership as a result of either Act because “no subsequent transferee may acquire that 
right of [hunting and fishing] or the reserved water necessary to fulfill that use.”  Id. at 1418.  Adair 
restates the controlling principle that tribal rights, like those reserved in the 1873 Reservation, are 
not abrogated by implication.  Id. at 1412 (citing Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. at 413).  As with 
Walton, nothing in the court’s analysis in Adair turned on whether or not Indian ownership of the 
Reservation lands was predominant. 
Finally, Anderson held that the Spokane Tribe was entitled to Winters rights to maintain 
instream flows in Chamokane Creek, despite non-Indian ownership of “much of the 
land . . . immediately adjacent to the Creek.”  591 F. Supp. at 5, 13.  The State asks this Court to 
consider Anderson “in the context of its unstated assumption that the Tribe retained either the bed 
of Chamokane Creek or sufficient uplands along the Creek such that opening of the reservation 
did not affect the Tribe’s fishing rights in the Creek . . . .”  State Br. at 41. (emphasis added).  As 
a matter of fact, however, the State is incorrect, because the Ninth Circuit in Anderson found that 
non-Indian fee land consisted of “most of the waterfront property within the reservation . . . .” 736 
F.2d at 1366 n.1 (emphasis added).   
Walton I, Adair, and Anderson confirm that reserved water rights to instream flows are 
implied to fulfill the fishing purpose of an Indian reservation, and are awarded in streams without 
regard to whether the water flows over or adjacent to non-Indian lands.  Contrary to the State’s 
assertion, none of these cases took into account whether those tribes “retain[ed] sufficient lands in 
and along the streams . . . to preserve fishing rights and provide it control of spawning and rearing 
habitat . . . .”  State Br. at 43.  This is so because ownership of a particular parcel of land is simply 





governing analysis turns on the purposes of the reservation, not on the physical location of the 
stream.  In the Winters case, for example, the Supreme Court enjoined non-Indian landowners 
entirely outside the Reservation from diversions that interfered with the purposes of the 
Reservation.  207 U.S. at 565, 568-69.  Accordingly, the district court correctly found the Tribe 
was entitled to reserved instream flow water rights within the Reservation based on the fishing 
purposes of the Reservation. 
B. The Tribe’s Instream Flow Water Rights Have Never Been Abrogated by 
Clear Action of Congress. 
The Coeur d’Alene Reservation was established by a grant of rights from the Tribe, which 
confirmed the Tribe’s pre-existing rights within the Reservation, including the right to continue its 
traditional activities.  Winans, 198 U.S. at 381; Dion, 476 U.S. at 737-38; see also Pocatello, 145 
Idaho at 506; State v. Coffee, 97 Idaho 905, 908, 556 P.2d 1185, 1188 (1976) (“treaties provide for 
retention by the Indians of hunting and fishing rights” on the reservation).  The Tribe’s water rights 
to instream flows necessary to support its traditional fishing activities vested when the 1873 
Reservation was established and, the district court correctly determined, carry a time immemorial 
priority date.  R. at 4326 (Order on Mots. S.J.). See also Arizona I, 323 U.S. at 600 
(“reserve[d] . . . water rights . . . effective as of the time the Indian Reservations were created”); 
Adair, 723 F.2d at 1414 (“Such water rights necessarily carry a priority date of time 
immemorial.”).  As this Court has recognized, under federal law these rights cannot be abrogated 
without a clear statement of congressional purpose, especially against the background of tribal 
opposition.  Pocatello, 145 Idaho at 506-07.  Congress has never made such a clear statement of 
purpose—either in the 1906 Allotment Act or otherwise—and consequently the Tribe still holds 





The State attempts to turn this controlling principle on its head by asserting that an express 
statement is required to retain the Tribe’s water rights on alienated lands within the Reservation.  
State Br. at 27, 29.  That simply is not the law.  The extinguishment of the Tribe’s water rights “is 
not to be lightly imputed to Congress,” and such a drastic result requires a clear expression of 
congressional intent.  Pocatello, 145 Idaho at 506-07.  Indeed, the Supreme Court held in 
Menominee Tribe that the Tribe’s rights survive not only the transfer of land to non-Indians 
pursuant to an allotment act, but the total termination of a reservation.  391 U.S at 412-13 
(declining to construe the Menominee Indian Termination Act, which terminated the Menominee 
Reservation, as a “backhanded way” of abrogating the Menominee Tribe’s hunting and fishing 
rights).   
This Court in State v. McConville, 65 Idaho 46, 139 P.2d 485, 487 (1943), rejected this 
very argument by the State: that “when the reservation was thrown open to settlement if the Indians 
had desired to retain the right to fish . . . there should have been a provision to that effect in the 
law or treaty.”  This Court instead concluded in McConville that such an express provision “was 
not necessary,” because “anything not specifically granted was retained” by the Indians and held 
that “[p]rivate ownership of some lands is not inconsistent with the [Tribe’s] right to fish . . . .”  
Id. 27   
Here, as in McConville, the State can point to no clear and express action by Congress 
abrogating the Tribe’s water rights—and there is none.  The language and legislative history of the 
Coeur d’Alene Allotment Act say nothing about abrogating the Tribe’s water rights.  The Coeur 
                                                 
27 Accord Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. 1001, 1004 (D. Minn. 
1971) (allotment act providing for the “complete extinguishment of the Indian title” held not to 
abrogate hunting and fishing rights because the act “said nothing about the Indian treaty rights to 
hunt and fish”); State v. Clark, 282 N.W.2d 902, 908-09 (Minn. 1979) (tribal hunting and fishing 
rights continued to exist on allotted land owned by non-Indians within the White Earth 





d’Alene Allotment Act, ch. 3504, 34 Stat. 325, 335-36 (1906), provided for allotments to be made 
to individual Indians in accordance with the General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887), 
which generally provided each Indian on a reservation would receive an allotment of 160 acres 
that would be held in trust by the United States for 25 years, id. § 5, 24 Stat. at 389.28  The Coeur 
d’Alene Allotment Act provided that lands remaining after allotment would be classified, 
appraised, and “opened to settlement and entry” by non-Indian homesteaders.  34 Stat. at 336.  
Lands not homesteaded remained in trust for the benefit of the Tribe.  R. at 798 (Smith Rep. 2016); 
2673 (Jt. Stmt. Facts ¶93).29  The mere fact that under the Coeur d’Alene Allotment Act ownership 
of certain lands were transferred to non-Indians does not constitute clear evidence that Congress 
intended to abrogate the Tribe’s water rights, which continued to serve the purposes of the 
Reservation. 
The State also overstates the effect of the Coeur d’Alene Allotment Act in suggesting that 
all communal ownership of lands within the Reservation ceased under the Act.  State Br. at 27.  
Although the Coeur d’Alene Allotment Act did cause the Tribe to lose ownership of some land to 
individual Indian allottees and non-Indian purchasers of surplus lands, the Tribe still retained the 
Reservation’s unsold and unallotted land for its beneficial use.  R. at 2673 (Jt. Stmt. Facts ¶93).  
See Ash Sheep Co. v. U.S., 252 U.S. 159, 166 (1920) (“until sales should be made, any benefits 
                                                 
28 The General Allotment Act did not partition and convey a tribe’s water rights as it did with lands 
conveyed to individual Indians.  See Grey v. U.S., 21 Cl.Ct. 285, 299 (1990) (“Nothing in the 
General Allotment Act or other statutes governing irrigation of allotments suggests that Congress 
was partitioning and conveying tribal water rights as it did with tribal lands.”).  The Supreme Court 
has held that the General Allotment Act merely permitted Indian allottees a right to share in the 
use of some tribal water rights, not that these rights were conveyed to allottees.  U.S. v. Powers, 
305 U.S. 527, 532 (1939) (Indian allottee has the “right to use some portion of tribal waters 
essential for cultivation”). 
29 The Tribe strongly opposed the Coeur d’Alene Allotment Act because the United States had 
promised that the Reservation would never be surveyed or sold without tribal consent.  R. at 1751 
(Hart Rep. 2015).  The Tribe viewed allotment and opening of the Reservation as “nothing short 





[for unsold surplus lands] which might be derived from the use of the lands would belong to the 
[tribe]”).  This land continued to be held for the benefit of the Tribe, including to support the 
exercise of the Tribe’s traditional activities.  By its terms, the Coeur d’Alene Allotment Act did 
not affect in any way the land which continued to be held for the Tribe’s benefit.  Thus, the State’s 
argument that the Tribe’s “[c]ommunal property rights ceased . . . when the reservation was 
allotted,” State Br. at 27, is at odds with the fact that the Tribe still had lands for its communal use 
and exercised its full measure of rights on that land.  The sale of land under the Coeur d’Alene 
Allotment Act merely permitted non-Indians to own property on the Reservation and thus affected 
the Tribe’s ability to exclude those landowners from their own property. 
The State seeks to deflect attention from the clear congressional statement requirement for 
abrogation of Indian rights with a discussion of case law on unrelated subjects, such as tribal 
regulatory jurisdiction over fee lands owned by non-Indians.  The State relies on three cases—
Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544 (1980), Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian 
Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989), and Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001)—which hold that tribes 
have limited jurisdiction to regulate non-Indian activities on lands they own in fee simple within 
reservations—as somehow supporting its claim that the Tribe’s instream flow water rights have 
been extinguished without Congress saying so.  State Br. at 30-35.  This case does not involve any 
assertion of tribal regulatory authority over non-Indians.  Rather, the Tribe simply seeks to 
adjudicate the existence of its senior water rights necessary to support the fishing purposes of the 
Reservation and to protect that water from being depleted by junior users.  That is precisely what 
the Winters case held when it enjoined non-Indians on fee lands outside the Reservation from 
interfering with water needed to fulfill the Tribe’s senior uses on the Reservation. 
The State also cites Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game of State of Washington, 





Montana, Hicks, and Brendale, Puyallup III has no application to the Tribe’s non-consumptive 
water rights necessary to protect its fisheries within the Reservation.  Puyallup III deals with the 
issue of when a state may regulate tribal fishing at on-reservation sites where non-Indians have a 
right to fish in common with Indians and when such regulation is necessary for conservation.  433 
U.S. at 167 & n.1.  The present case involves tribal water rights, not state regulatory authority over 
treaty fishing sites.   
Finally, the State claims that Blake v. Arnett, 663 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1981), supports “the 
loss of rights [by the Tribe] on alienated reservation lands . . . .”  State Br. at 34.  In Blake, the 
Ninth Circuit addressed whether tribal members had the right to “enter and cross lands of [a non-
Indian fee land owner] to exercise . . . hunting and fishing rights.”  663 F.2d at 908.  The Ninth 
Circuit held that in allotting land on the Klamath River Reservation,30  Congress intended to “grant 
an unencumbered title to the Indian allottees and their successors in interest, which would not be 
subject to any interest in the land that might be implied from the mere creation of the reservation.”  
Id. at 911 (emphasis added).  Blake is inapplicable because this case does not involve issues related 
to a right of access or any other property interest on non-Indian land. As discussed above, the Tribe 
claims a non-consumptive use right to maintain instream flows in water that flows over non-Indian 




                                                 
30  The State mistakenly states, State Br. at 34-35, that Blake arose on the Klamath Indian 
Reservation—which is the locus of the Adair case.  723 F.2d at 1397-98.  In fact, Blake involved 
the Klamath River Reservation, which is a different reservation in California.  663 F.2d at 908. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the district court’s determination that (1) the Coeur d’Alene 
Reservation was established in 1873; (2) reserved water was implied to fulfill the domestic, 
fishing, hunting, and agricultural purposes of the Reservation; (3) the fishing and hunting purposes 
of the Reservation carry a time immemorial priority date; and (4) the agricultural purposes carry 
an 1873 priority date. 
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of April, 2018. 
Counsel for the Coeur d’Alene Tribe 
By: ______________________________ 
Vanessa L. Ray-Hodge 
40 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served by USPS Priority 
Mail, on this 13th day of April, 2018, upon the following: 
ALBERT P. BARKER 
Barker Rosholt & Simpson LLP 
PO Box 2139 
Boise, ID  83701-2139 
apb@idahowaters.com 
US Department of Justice 
Environment & Natural Resources 
550 West Fort Street, MSC 033 
Boise, ID  83724 
CANDICE M. MCHUGH 
CHRIS BROMLEY 
McHugh Bromley PLLC 
380 S 4th Street, Suite 103 
Boise, ID  83702 
cmchugh@mchughbromley.com 
cbromley@mchughbromley.com 
NORMAN M. SEMANKO 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
800 W. Main Street, Suite 1300 
Boise, ID  83702 
nsemanko@parsonsbehle.com 
MARIAH R. DUNHAM 
NANCY A. WOLFF 
Morris & Wolff, P.A. 
722 Main Ave. 
St Maries, ID  83861 
mdunham@morriswolff.net 
nwolff@morriswolff.net 
ERIKA B. KRANZ 
Unite States Department of Justice 
Environment & Natural Resources Div. 
Appellate Section 
P.O. Box 7415 
Washington, DC  20044 
erika.kranz@usdoj.gov 
STEVE STRACK 
Chief Natural Resources Division 
Office of the Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID  83720-0010 
steve.strack@ag.idaho.gov 
CHRISTOPHER H. MEYER,  
JEFFREY C. FEREDAY,  
JEFFERY W. BOWER 
MICHAEL P. LAWRENCE 
Givens Pursley LLP 
PO Box 2720  
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
mpl@givenspursley.com 
WILLIAM J. SCHROEDER 
KSB Litigation PS 
221 North Wall Street, Suite 210 
Spokane, WA 99201 
william.schroeder@ksblit.legal 
IDWR Document Depository 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID  83720-0098 
John T. McFaddin 
20189 S. Eagle Peak Rd 
Cataldo, ID  83810 
Ratliff Family LLC #1 
13621 S HWY 95 
Coeur d’Alene, ID  83814 
Ronald Heyn 
828 Westfork Eagle Creek  
Wallace, ID  83873  
 
 
 
 
 
 
